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ABSTRACT 
From philosophical point of view, micro-founded economic theories depart from the principle of the 
pursuit of the greatest happiness. From mathematical point of view, micro-founded economic theories 
depart from the utility maximisation program. Though economists are aware of the serious limitations 
of the equilibrium analysis, they remain in that framework. We show that the maximisation principle, 
which implies the equilibrium hypothesis, is responsible for this impasse. We formalise the pursuit of 
the greatest happiness principle by the help of the driving force postulate: the volumes of activities 
depend on the expected wealth increase. In that case we can get rid of the equilibrium hypothesis and 
have  new  insights  into  economic  theory.  For  example,  in  what  extent  standard  economic  results 
depend on the equilibrium hypothesis? 
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INTRODUCTION 
The omnipotence of general equilibrium theory got serious leak during the recent financial 
crisis. Most of the critics addressed to the general equilibrium theory draws attention to some 
important limitations of the general equilibrium theory. Nevertheless, most of these critics 
basically stay within the same equilibrium framework. 
The starting point for this equilibrium framework was the mathematical formalisation of the 
generally accepted aim of human behaviour: the pursuit of greatest happiness. Unfortunately, 
this greatest happiness principle was formalised by the help of the maximisation postulate. 
Solving for optimum has sense only if all the possible choices and constraints are known. In 
other terms, finding optimal solutions from a given set of possibilities is equivalent with the 
hypothesis of equilibrium. No doubt, economic systems are fairly complex systems: when 
agents  take  decisions,  they  do  not  know  all  the  possible  contingencies.  In  other  terms, 
economic systems are far from being equilibrium systems. Therefore, the mathematical tool 
of optimisation, which allowed for great advances in economic theory in the 19th and 20th 
century, seems to constitute now the major obstacle for the further development of a useful 
and coherent economic theory. 
In this paper we show that the adoption of the 19th century’s Newtonian tool is not necessary 
for the development of a general mathematical economic theory. The modern 20th century’s 
tool of non-equilibrium thermodynamics allows us to avoid the unacceptable simplification of 
equilibrium. Naturally, the existence of general equilibrium still can be obtained as a special case. 
To do so, in the first point we remember two basic axioms used in economic theories. In the 
second  point,  we  consider  the  decisional  problem  of  individuals  in  a  way  like  standard 
economics in order to make an anchor for comparison. In the third point, we develop the new 
theoretical framework, which is not based on the maximisation principle, but on the idea of 
driving force. Finally, we briefly discuss the two frameworks. 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL BACKGROUND: TWO AXIOMS 
A possible method for modelling the functioning of economic systems is micro-founded when 
we start from the behaviour and interactions of individuals. This method, called methodological 
individualism, requires that we attribute intentional actions only for individuals 1. 
Intentional actions are preceded by decisions. Decisions can be taken in several ways. The 
point is to make hypotheses on individual decisions, which are not corroborated by empirical 
evidence,  i.e.  the  observed  actions  are  in  parallel  with  the  prediction  of  the  behavioural 
hypotheses on individuals. In this regard, M. Friedman’s “as if” critique is generally not 
correctly interpreted 2. In fact, Friedman does not argue against the testing of hypotheses. 
He argues against the burden of social sciences, when hypotheses are qualified contradictory 
to empirical evidence just because modellers want model agents to behave reasonably, that is 
to  say  conform  to  the  modellers  understanding.  No  one  would  qualify  a  behavioural 
hypothesis on a molecule unacceptable, because the modeller would behave in a different 
way if he were a molecule. With Friedman’s billiard player example: the empirical evidence 
is that a good billiard player shoots with very few mistakes. But we cannot test how he does it. 
A lot of scientists would however be inclined to drop the hypothesis that billiard players 
solve trigonometric equations, because if they play, they do not solve equations. But the 
modeller’s thoughts are not tests as in natural sciences. 
The generally accepted rule for intentional decisions in economics is of no harm. It reaches 
back to the founding proponents of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Greatest happiness principle in a complex system: maximisation versus driving force 
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Stuart Mill (1806-1873) 3, 4: the governing law of human actions would be the “pursuit of 
the  greatest  happiness”.  The  reason  why  this  governing  law  is  of  great  success  may  be 
twofold. First, because the existence of happiness is of the same reality as the existence of a 
stone: everybody can feel it, though it cannot be observed directly as the stone. Second, 
because  without  further  conceptualization  the  happiness  is  a  vague  notion,  therefore  the 
postulate of the pursuit of the greatest happiness cannot be tested. 
That  is  to  say,  micro-founded  economic  theories  formulate  (explicitly  or  implicitly)  the 
following axioms 5, 6: 
1) Axiom: the ultimate reason for any human decision is the pursuit of the greatest happiness. 
This axiom is supported by empirical evidence. In addition, the happiness hypothesis is 
reasonable for the modeller. The pursuit of happiness was identified with the maximisation 
of  utility  in  modern  economics.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  utility 
maximisation  conceptualisation  is  just  one  possible  way  to  translate  the  pursuit  of 
happiness principle in an exact operational form. 
2) Axiom: the state of happiness is affected, among other factors, by the stocks of goods. 
Measurable goods to be taken into account for individual decisions  have the common 
feature of being: useful (happiness change with the change in the quantity of stocks), 
quantifiable (measurable) and that balance equations can be set for their variations
1. 
This  hypothesis  is  also  parallel  to  the  empirical  evidence  and  also  reasonable  from  the 
modeller’s  point  of  view.  Three  important  points  are  to  be  mentioned.  First,  standard 
economics  considers  a  slight  modification  of  this  axiom:  the  variation  of  the  state  of 
happiness  depends  on  the  consumption  of  goods.  Stocks  are  taken  into  account  as  the 
consumption of the “service d’approvisionnement” of a stock of good 7. It is important to 
underline that consumption is flow variable. But the function that describes happiness is a 
state function that depends on stocks and stock-like variables. As we will see, the slight 
modification of standard economic theory has serious consequences. Second, the existence of 
the list  of goods  implies  some institutional hypotheses.  As an example, we can think of 
money. The allocation of goods for the overall economy describes the state of the economy at 
a point in time. The dynamics of the variation of individual allocations is given by the dynamic 
equations  for  the  change  of  goods.  Third,  Lyubomirsky’s  empirical  research  show  that 
property accounts for less than 10 % of individual happiness. In fact, psychogenetic factors 
are responsible for 50 %, voluntary actions account for 40 %, and other factors – economic 
goods included – explain just the remaining 10 % 8. This empirical test has disastrous 
implications as to the optimisation tool of standard economics. Happiness is largely dependent 
on non quantifiable variables. Therefore, there is no sense to find an optimum on a limited set 
of quantifiable variables. In fact, the optimisation with the omission of one constraint may 
give worse results than a random choice. In summary, the use of optimisation as a general 
tool is just a burden for economic science as already underlined by many economists, e.g. 9. 
After these remarks, let us follow the economic tradition and denote the list of stocks by the 
vector X. The second axiom implies that we can write balance equations for the variation of 
an agent’s stocks. The variation of the j-th stock of agent A is: 
 
A
j
k AB,
j
A
j d D J = X
k B
  ,   
where Jj
AB,k stands for the volume of the j-th stock’s change in agent A’s relation of the k-th 
type with agent B. Dj
A is a term for describing dissipation type variations. This dissipation 
term is generally neglected in economics, in spite of the fact that it is strictly positive by the K. Martinás and Z. Gilányi 
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force of the law of nature. Let us consider the Nature as a special agent (B = 0), and money as a 
special good (index j = 0 for money). Here are some possible J vectors if we have three goods:  
J
AA,2 = (0, +2, –2) means that agent A can transform (produce) 2 units of the second into 2 units 
of the first good in the second type of stock change. The quantity of the 0th good – money – does 
not change. It is important to note that if symbolic goods are included into the list of goods (if 
the first good were nutritional stocks in the body) then the said transformation would describe 
consumption. That is to say, consumption could be considered as a special production. 
J
AB,1 = (–1, +2, +1) the first type of stock change between agent A and B means that agent A 
spends 1 unit of money for 2 units of the first goods and one unit of the second good. 
J
AB,2 = (–1, +2, +2) the second type of stock change between A and B means that agent A 
spends 1 unit of money for two units of the first good and two units of second good. 
J
AB,3 = (–2, +4, +4) the third type of stock change between A and B means that agent A 
spends 2 units of money for four units of the first good and four units of the second good. 
That is to say there are as many J vectors as possible portions of the commodities. With 
infinitely  divisible  goods  naturally  there  would  be  an  infinite  number  of  possible  stock 
changes. We note that these possible stock exchanges implicitly contain price ratios. 
We note that in real time, an agent can make just one action at a time. Therefore, the type of 
stock change k identifies the agent B at the same time. Hence, the index B can be omitted. 
DECISIONAL  PROBLEM  OF  STANDARD  ECONOMICS:  THE 
MAXIMISATION PRINCIPLE 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us start from what we know. In the previous point, 
we have supposed that an agent pursuit the greatest happiness. We have also noted that this 
axiom was formalised by the utility maximisation program. That is to say, “happiness” was 
replaced  with  “utility”  and  “pursuit  of  greatest”  with  “greatest  (maximisation)”.  With 
unlimited happiness in goods (no saturation point), this maximisation problem would have no 
solution. Therefore, a budget constraint is added to the maximisation problem. The budget 
constraint  is  a  natural  constraint  in  a  market  economy.  It  simply  asserts  that  agents  can 
purchase goods only in the extent of the value of goods they offer. This constraint can be 
weakened (include debt or money holdings). Even if we omit the interpretative problems that 
occur with these modifications (“money holdings” as well as “debts” cannot be considered as 
“money holdings” 10 and “debts” 11), the constraint that determines the choice of the 
economic agent is fundamentally a financial constraint. As we will show later, there is no 
need  for  this  artefact  (individual  choice  is  not  exclusively  constrained  by  financial 
constraints) in order to have a definite mathematical description of individual choice. 
If prices expressed in monetary terms are denoted by p and there are j = 1, ..., N commodities 
(that is to say money is excluded), the decisional problem of an individual can be written as: 
 
 
0
...
k A,
j
j
k A,
j j
k A,
N
k A,
1
A
  J M = J p
J , J U
 
  
where M stands for the income (money) of the economic agent. Money in nominal terms does 
not generally enter into the utility function, because it would mean that with doubled money 
stock and doubled prices (that is to say the budget constraint remains the same) the economic 
agent would be better-off 
2. The utility function evaluates the J vectors without money: 
J
AB,1 = (–1, +2, +1)  U
A(2, 1), Greatest happiness principle in a complex system: maximisation versus driving force 
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J
AB,2 = (–1, +2, +2)  U
A(2, 2), 
J
AB,3 = (–2, +4, +4)  U
A(4, 4). 
That is to say, standard economics formulates the decisional problem of the individual as a 
problem of choosing from a set of possible alternatives the best one. In order to make this 
decisional problem well defined, prices are to be taken as known variables. Furthermore, 
prices  agents  face  must  be  uniform  (the  same  good  should  have  the  same  price  in  all 
exchanges). Otherwise we would not be in general equilibrium. (In the general equilibrium 
theory any planned exchanges can be executed. Hence, price differentials for the same good 
would allow for arbitrage, i.e.: gains just by making further exchanges.) In brief, without the 
uniform price taker agents we cannot find a general equilibrium solution. 
However,  the  existence  of  the  uniform  price  taker  agent  assumption  is  not  harmless.  It 
excludes the explicit introduction of any price adjustment mechanism into the model (we 
cannot have the empirical evidence of the law of demand and supply i.e.: prices change in the 
direction of excess demand as a result). Furthermore, it undermines the logical coherence of 
standard  economic  theory  as  a  theory  of  market  economies:  the  characteristic  of  a 
decentralised market economy is precisely that agents do not know when markets clear and 
they can make exchanges at disequilibrium prices 12. 
The point is that if agents’ decisional problems are defined with the maximisation principle, 
the uniform price assumption is also needed to find a general equilibrium solution. If a pair 
wise exchange mechanism is considered when agents are allowed to make exchanges also at 
disequilibrium prices, than we lose the results of the general equilibrium theory (no Pareto – 
efficiency  with  respect  to  the  original  initial  endowments)  13  and  the  use  of  the 
maximisation principle loses its sense (supposed translation of the principle of the pursuit of 
the greatest happiness into mathematical language). 
Therefore,  it  seems  to  us  that  the  maximisation  principle  constitutes  one  of  the  major 
obstacles before the description of price formation in a decentralised market economy. In 
order to avoid this problem, we show another solution to the individual’s decisional problem, 
which is also parallel to the pursuit of the greatest happiness principle. 
DECISIONAL PROBLEM REVISITED: THE DRIVING FORCE PRINCIPLE 
As we have seen, the standard representation of economic agents is the maximisation of 
utility under the budget constraints. Let us abandon this representation 14, 15. For the sake 
of  simplicity,  let  us  consider  just  a  very  simple  pure  exchange  economy  and  develop 
monetary  exchange.  We  consider  just  one  commodity  and  money  and  also  suppose  that 
differentials can be used. This is the most straightforward way to compare our representation 
with  the  standard  decisional  problem.  The  abandon  of  the  standard  representation  of  the 
economic agent means that we abandon the utility concept and the maximisation principle. 
To abandon the utility concept means that we abandon the function, which relates the flows 
of commodities J to the variation of happiness. Instead, we consider that happiness can be 
given by a function H( ), which depends on the stocks of commodities X that an agent holds. 
As stocks determine just a small part of happiness, we will rather call it “subjective wealth” 
and denote it by Z. In brief, instead of dZ = U(J), we have Z(X) as to the formalisation of the 
second axiom. If Z is a differentiable function, then the change of Z is defined by the change 
of stocks. Mathematically, for the change of wealth in our very simple setting we have: 
 
A
A
A
A
A
A
A d d d M
M
Z
X
X
Z
Z





 .   K. Martinás and Z. Gilányi 
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It is logical to call the expression Z/X the subjective value of commodity X, because the 
variation  of  X  changes  individual  subjective  wealth,  i.e.  it  characterises  the  change  of  the 
subjective wealth. 
We treat money as other commodities, that is to say money enters in nominal terms into the 
subjective wealth function. This means that money has also positive subjective value. For 
economists this assumption needs explication because of the utility concept, even if it seems 
a quite natural assumption from our daily life. As to economic arguments underlying this 
assumption let us recall the St. Petersburg’s paradox. The paradox is a simple pile or face 
game: the first face pays as many dollars as the number of trials and the game stops if there is 
a pay-off. The expected value of this game is infinity, but people are willing to pay a very 
limited amount for such a game. The solution to this paradox proposed by Bernoulli is to 
enter the pay-off into the utility function, and to suppose a root square dependence between 
income  and  utility.  In  brief,  the  lesson  from  this  paradox  is  that  money  enters  into  the 
evaluation function, thus it has subjective value. 
From  theoretical  point  of  view,  the  hypothesis  that  money  has  positive  subjective  value 
implies that money also has positive value in exchange. A good part of standard monetary 
theorists take this hypothesis unacceptable: for them, the positive exchange value of money 
should be a result 16. We join economists who consider the positive exchange value of 
money problem as a false problem. The reason is simple: we do not believe that the choice of 
a consumption bundle is at the same level as the choice of the transactions technique 17. 
That is to say, an agent can independently choose a consumption bundle of other agents, as 
opposed to the transaction technique, where agents’ choices are interdependent. In brief, the 
subjective value of money is not just a mathematical artefact. 
The subjectivity of values naturally does not mean that values are arbitrary
3 and that values 
are constant. The subjective values attributed to the goods can be reappraised for two reasons: 
first, because of the success or failure of actions (this implies also expectations, which are 
always based on information and the agent understanding); secondly because of the change in 
the  quantity  of  goods  owned  by  the  agent.  In  general,  the  subjective  value  of  the  good 
decreases with the increase of its quantity. 
In our conceptualisation the subjective value is the wealth (happiness) increase due to the 
increase in the stock of the good. That is not observable. Nevertheless, relative values can be 
observed. In our money economies, the most convenient way to measure subjective values is 
a measure in terms of money. The subjective value in monetary terms of the commodity X is
4 
 
M Z
X Z
v
 
 

/
/
.   
The measure is straightforward: we offer for an individual the purchase of the commodity X 
at different prices. The individual will buy the commodity if it worth at least as much for him 
as the price he has to pay. The opposite is also true. If we observe the realised purchases of the 
same agent we can have an upper and a lower limit for the subjective values in monetary terms. 
Finally, we note that there is still no consensus among economists how to define money. In 
general, money is defined with some functions that it performs. In the above representation 
we have just used the two generally accepted characteristics of money: stock variable and 
unit of account. We also emphasise for economists to whom money in nominal terms in the 
evaluation function is shocking that for us the evaluation function is not the utility function. 
In summary, for the variation of the subjective wealth function we have the following expression: Greatest happiness principle in a complex system: maximisation versus driving force 
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   
A A A
A
A
A d d d M + X v
M
Z
= Z


.   
If the price of commodity X is p (pdXA = –dMA), and if we utilise that dXA = JA in our simple 
case, then we finally have: 
     
A A
A
A
A A
A
A
A d   d J p v
M
Z
= X p v
M
Z
= Z 





.   
If we kept the maximization rule, the solution of the above expression would have been the 
well known result of general equilibrium theory: 
v
A(J
A) = p. 
Nevertheless, let us abandon the maximisation rule as to the formalisation of the pursuit of 
the greatest happiness principle. As already mentioned, the maximisation rule implies that 
agents seek opportunities until equilibrium is reached. As all real processes need time, the 
abandon of the maximisation rule is equivalent to the abandon of the timeless (or infinite 
time) setting of the equilibrium framework (in addition, it is empirical evidence that no one 
will seek all the opportunities when shopping). 
In brief, instead of the maximisation principle, let us assert that the volume of the transactions (J) 
depends on the unit gain of the subjective wealth in monetary terms (v –p). If we denote this 
function by G( ), we have: 
J
A = G
A(v
A –p). 
In fact, G( ) may depend also on other variables and expectations. We note that standard 
economics considers a special form of this relation, the individual (net) demand curves. 
As a further simplification, let us consider a linear approximation of this function: 
J
A = L
A(v
A –p). 
where L represents the willingness of transaction. In fact, the willingness of transactions has 
the indexes (as prices): Lj
AB where j stands for the commodity j and A and B for the agents 
involved in the transaction. 
The above expression shows that the same expected gain implies different decisions (actions) 
as L
A changes. As an example, if agent B has already cheated agent A, than agent A can 
choose never to make exchanges with agent B, that is to say Lj
AB = 0. Or, agent A can choose 
to make exchanges just of the commodity j (for example the commodity j is not an experience 
good) but not of the commodity i. 
It is straightforward to introduce any price determination mechanism. As an example, the 
determination of the price of commodity X in a bilateral exchange for two identical agents 
using the tautology that what agent A gives in the exchange agents B obtains and vica versa 
(Jj
AB + Jj
BA = 0), we have: 
L(v
A –p) + L(v
B –p) = 0, 
hence 
p = (v
A + v
B)/2. 
At the end of this bilateral exchange, there is no guarantee that v
A = v
B. Therefore the two 
agents can make further exchanges until the two evaluations will be the same. Whether they 
do it or not, depends on the exact definition of the price formation mechanism. 
If agents have different willingness of transactions L, then we have: 
  B A
B B A A
L + L
v L + v L
= p . 
The quantity exchanged is: K. Martinás and Z. Gilányi 
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 
B A
B A
B A
A v v
L + L
L L
= J  . 
General  equilibrium  theory  considers  the  state  when  there  is  no  further  possibility  of 
exchange. However, agent should make exchanges at the predetermined equilibrium price: it 
is clear that in that case for bilateral exchange (with several agents) the double coincidence of 
wants would not necessarily hold. The general equilibrium solution is then a special case: we 
should imagine that at the predetermined equilibrium price, agents make exchanges with a 
fictive agent of infinite stocks, but at the end of the realisation of all exchanges the stock 
change of the fictive agent is 0. This is the well known role of the Walrasian auctioneer in the 
general equilibrium theory. Put aside the condition of the zero stock change, the implicit 
assumption behind the Walrasian auctioneer is straightforward: the hypothesis of free exchanges 
at will at the given price is equivalent to the equilibrium assumption. If the special equilibrium 
price – when the stock changes of the Walrasian auctioneer is zero – would not be set as a 
further condition, the result of the general equilibrium theory would be a complete tautology. 
It is well known that the general equilibrium solution is just one possible solution of the 
equilibrium market price problem. In fact, if agents are allowed to make exchanges at will 
(included disequilibrium prices), the equilibrium outcome of the exchange process will be 
different  from  the  predetermined  general  equilibrium  solution  13.  The  driving  force 
description  of  economic  decisions  contains  explicitly  this  result:  depending  on  the  L 
parameters and on the way agents meet, the equilibrium outcome will also be different. 
If  we  abandon  the  pure  exchange  setting,  we  can  develop  a  general  form  for  individual 
decisions. We mean by general form that the decisional problem is the same for each agent 
(consumer, producer) and for each economic action (exchange, production). 
To do so, let us introduce unit bundles denoted by e. The unit bundle is indexed as e
AB,k. This 
means that when the k-th type of stock change is considered in agent A and B’s relation, the 
good flows are given by the vector e
AB,k. As above, let us drop index B as the type of stock 
change in real time determines at the same time the other agent involved in the transaction. In 
that case, we can write for the variation of stock j in the k-th type of stock change: 
Jj
A,k = ej
A,k I
A,k. 
where I
A,k stands for the scalar of volume in the k-th type of stock change between agent A 
and agent B. The set of unit flow bundles e characterises the agents. With this notation, the 
variation of individual wealth (dissipation omitted) can be written as: 
  




k j,
k A, k A,
j A
j
A
k j,
k A,
j A
j
A
k
k A, A d d d I e
X
Z
= X
X
Z
= Z = Z  
where j = 0 stands for money. The driving force principle states, if agents pursue the greatest 
happiness, the (subjective) wealth gain on the unit bundle and the volume of the activity 
cannot be independent. Let us denote the (subjective) wealth gain on the unit bundle of the k-th 
type of stock change by F
k, and the subjective wealth of the j-th stock for agent A, Z
A/Xj
A, 
by wj
A. That is to say: 
 


j
k A,
j
A
j
j
k A,
j A
j
A
k A, e w = e
X
Z
= F , 
 
k
k A, k A,
k
k A, A d d I F = Z = Z . 
Following the driving force principle, F and I are not mutually independent: 
I
A,k = I
A,k(F
A,k) = I
A,k(w
Ae
A,k)  Greatest happiness principle in a complex system: maximisation versus driving force 
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Taking  a  metaphor  from  physics,  F
A,k  can  be  considered  as  the  economic  driving  force 
between agents A and B in the k-th type of stock change. The economic driving force is 
hence the expected wealth increase on a unit bundle change in an economic activity. Using 
first order linear approximation of this relationship, we can finally write: 

j
k A,
j
A
j
k A, k A, k A, k A, .   =       =   e w L F L I  
This formulation, with the help of the unit bundle, puts forward the fact that the choice is not 
directly on the flow vector of the variation of stocks J, but there is a double choice: the type 
of activity k and its volume I
k is selected. 
In summary, the dynamics of the economic system can be characterised by the following 
equations (for j = 0, 1, ..., N goods and all the agents A, B, ...): 
   
k
A
j
k AB,
j
A
j
k AB,
j
k
A
j
k AB,
j
k AB,
j
A
j
d
d
D e w e = D I e =
t
X
 
under the condition: 
I
AB,k = I
BA,k 
As we can see, this is a non-linear differential system, because subjective values depend on 
stocks. Therefore, it is more complicated than the well-known Lotka-Volterra equation. The 
solution  of  nonlinear  differential  equations  largely  depends  on  the  initial  conditions 
(parameters). Therefore, the question whether these systems have equilibrium solutions and 
whether these equilibrium solutions are attractors, is not straightforward. It follows that the 
results of equilibrium economics have to be handled with care. Which results follow just 
from the equilibrium hypothesis and which ones can be considered as economic laws? 
CONCLUSION 
Standard economic theory has been dominating the economic thinking for decades. Though 
most  of  the  economists  are  aware  of  the  serious  conceptual  limitations  of  the  standard 
framework, they still use it either because they state that “we do not have better” or because 
they (abusively) use M. Friedman’s “as if” logic. 
We have shown on the one hand that none of the above excuses are valid and on the other 
hand the reason why economists cannot get out of the trap of standard economic framework. 
In  fact,  the  mathematical  formulation  of  economic  thoughts  that  made  possible  great 
advances in economic theory is that, which ties the hands of economists, Table 1. 
Table 1. Brief comparison of two approaches in economics. 
Postulates, 
consequences  Standard economics  Complex system’s approach 
Basic postulate for 
individual decisions 
Pursuit of the greatest 
happiness  Pursuit of the greatest happiness 
Working postulate for 
individual decisions  Maximisation of utility  Driving force of economic activities 
is subjective wealth increase 
consequence 1  Maximisation → Equilibrium 
analysis  Driving force → No restriction 
consequence 2  Utility → money has no 
subjective value 
Subjective wealth → money has 
also subjective value 
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REMARKS 
1As an example, a certainly incomplete list of measurable stocks that affect our happiness 
includes:  material  goods  (bread),  money,  time  (labour),  relational  goods,  physiological 
factors and knowledge. Time is a special source of happiness. It can be formally subsumed 
under the stock description because we make decisions how to use time and which type of 
activity to select. Relational goods capture the affective and communicative components of 
interpersonal relations. Physiological factors characterize the state of the body or bodily 
functions (fitness, appearance). 
2Utility is the satisfaction of human needs from the consumption of goods. If the consumption 
bundle does not change, utility should also be the same. 
3A little child who attributes high value to a little toy but no value to a $ 100 banknote is willing 
to make the exchange of the banknote for the toy but not vice versa. However, if she learns 
that she can get 10 toys for the banknote she will probably not exchange it just for one toy. 
4This  expression  shows  that  money  has  no  value  in  monetary  terms.  This  assertion  has 
already been formulated by Marx 18 in another context, when he stated that the general 
equivalent excludes itself from the realm of commodities. 
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PRINCIP NAJVEĆE SREĆE U KOMPLEKSNOM SUSTAVU: 
MAKSIMIZIRANJE U USPOREDBI S POKRETAČKOM SILOM 
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SAŽETAK 
S filozofskog stajališta, ekonomske teorije utemeljene na mikro-razini odstupaju od principa teženja najvećoj 
sreći.  S  matematičkog  stajališta,  ekonomske  teorije  utemeljene  na  mikro-razini  odstupaju  od  programa 
maksimiziranja korisnosti. Iako su ekonomisti svjesni ozbiljnih ograničenja ravnotežne analize i dalje ostaju u 
tom okviru. Pokazujemo kako je princip maksimiziranja, koji podrazumijeva hipotezu ravnoteže, odgovoran za 
to. Formaliziramo težnju za princip najveće sreće pomoću postulata pokretačke sile: opseg aktivnosti ovisi o 
očekivanom  povećanju  bogatstva.  U  tom  slučaju  uklanjamo  hipotezu  ravnoteže  i  dobivamo  novi  uvid  u 
ekonomsku teoriju. Npr. o tome u kojoj mjeri standardni ekononmski rezultati ovise o hipotezi ravnoteži? 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI 
pokretačka sila, hipoteza ravnoteže, maksimiziranje korisnosti 